Происхождение и структура Талмуда.

[nedosionist]

1. Запутанность изложения Талмуда отражает двойную задачу Хазаль – передачи Торы (Авот 1:2), и ее сокрытия (Авот 1:1). Сделано это было путем составления масштабнейшей системы головоломок (puzzles/riddles). Буквальный смысл зачастую предназначался для непосвященных: для амхаарец, для женщин итп., и отчасти является просто ложным следом, маскирующим более глубокий слой смысла.


R.Jose said: Abba Eleazar told me: Once we had a calf which was a peace-sacrifice, and we brought it to the Women's Court, and women laid the hands on it — not that the laying on of the hands has to be done by women, but in order to gratify the women. ... R. Ammi said: His argument runs: Firstly and secondly. Firstly, it was no laying on of the hands at all, and secondly, it was [done] In order to gratify the women.(Хаг 16б)

Beth Shammai answered: When we declared the foodstuffs and liquids therein clean, we declared them clean [only] for [the ‘am ha-arez]. himself; but should we [therefore] declare [also] the vessel clean, which would make it clean for thee as well as for him? ... Are the vessels of an ‘am ha-arez clean or unclean? He replied: Unclean. — And if thou sayest to him [that they are] unclean, will he pay any heed to thee? Nay, more, if thou sayest to him [that they are] unclean, he will reply: Mine are clean and thine are unclean. (Хаг 22б)

В обоих этих примерах, кстати, интересно еще и то, что поддержание иллюзии и благорасположения несведущих получает приоритет над разъяснением истины. Дилемма эта вполне понятна, но это довольно-таки антипросвещенческое отношение, и традиция, построенная на нем неизбежно приведет к самовоспроизводству популярных мифов.

2. Однако при этом нельзя считать, что смысл этих головоломок был очевиден всем Хазаль.

[Вследствие конфликта между ведущими рабби] On being told that R. Simeon b. Gamaliel had issued that ordinance, R. Meir said to R. Nathan, ... — Let us request him to discourse upon the tractate of ‘Ukzin with which he is unfamiliar, and as he will be unable to discourse upon it… ... He [R. Simeon b. Gamaliel] gave the order and they [R. Meir and R. Nathan] were removed from the college. Thereupon they wrote down scholastic difficulties on slips of paper which they threw into the college. That which he solved was disposed of and as to those which he did not solve they wrote down the answers and threw them in. Said R. Jose to them: The Torah is without and we are within! (Хор 13б) [Остается лишь представить, как юный р. Иуда, будущий ха-Наси, аккуратно собирает и подшивает эти головоломки в папочку «Мишна».] Rabbi declared: The only reason why I am keener than my colleagues is that I saw the back of R. Meir. (Ерув 13б).

Как видно из предществующей истории конфликта рр. Меира, р. Натана, и р. Симеона (в Хор 13, и см. ниже) знание нюансов Торы являлось инструментом политической борьбы между рабби и их направлениями (втч. между фарисеями и саддукеями). Тем самым поддержание кодификации Мишны в состоянии, понятном лишь для своих, создавало искусственные конкурентные преимущества.

3. Структура Талмуда отражает разделение в уровнях Торы, обсуждаемое ранее.

А. Уровень чистоты и запрещенных отношений – в трактатах, написанных относительно внятным языком (поскольку такое понятие вообще применимо к Гемаре), с меньшим использованием противопоставлений, особенно в женских (Nashim). Это кстати, проясняет, почему большое количество информативных рассказов помещено в комментариях во вроде бы странных секциях.

Б. Уровень берешит/шаббата – обсуждается в трактатах, написанных более запутанно, где двойное дно почти повсюду: Берахот, Шабат итд.

В. Уровень меркавы обсуждается в трактатах Мишны, где нет Гемары. Почему ее там нет? Потому что ее «не говорят одному» (Хаг 11б); и это может отражать «R. Hiyya taught: But the headings of chapters may be transmitted to him.» (Хаг 13а), где «заголовки глав» – это мишны. Тезис о том, что эти агро-трактаты применимы лишь к Земле Обетованой, выглядит вполне уместно.

Но нельзя просто полагаться на отсутствие Гемары. (Речь о Вавилонском; Иерусалимский Талмуд комментирует некоторые из них, но у меня есть сомнения в адекватности.) При такой трактовке возникает естественная проблема: как можно утверждать, что некий трактат Мишны не комментирован, поскольку он слишком сложный, а не поскольку он очевидный? Тут помогают отсылки в тексте на имеющиеся сложности, выглядит это так:

Orlah, Ukzin: Aher mutilated the shoots. (Hag 14b)
Ukzin: Let us request him to discourse upon the tractate of ‘Ukzin with which he is unfamiliar, and as he will be unable to discourse upon it… (Hor 13b, и см. выше)
Oholoth, Negaim: Said R. Eleazar b. ‘Azariah to him: Akiba, what hast thou to do with Aggadah? Cease thy talk, and turn to leprosy-signs and tent-covering! (Hag 14a, и ранее)

Я предполагаю, что в Гемаре нет подобных ссылок на комментированные трактаты (с Гемарой).

4. Из всего этого довольно много практических следствий. Поскольку мейнстримное прочтение игнорирует эти различия, то дальнейшая эволюция иудаизма естественным образом следовала подходу, предназначенному для амхаарец. Это субъективно корректируемо: можно читать, а что бы здесь подумал амхаарец, и отсюда, по контрасту – в чем сложность. Возможно, что разные рабби последовательно акцентировались на разных из этих подходов, и поэтому надо учитывать авторство комментатора. Видимо, порядок чтения, предлагаемый даф йоми, предполагает однородность сложности трактатов и мб. неоптимальный, возможно лучше начинать с более простых. Есть опасение, что понимание некторых некомментированных трактатов Мишны утеряно вовсе и невостановимо.

Как пример использования: я заметил связь первых мишн Авот с обсуждаемой темой в Хагига лишь когда попытался классифицировать Авот в эту схему (вопрос остался открытым), и читать ее как Мишну. И это несмотря на то, что я уже ранее цитировал и то, и другое.

Disclaimer: это отражает текущее мнение, которое вскоре изменится. :)

Comments

Re: fallacy

[nedosionist.livejournal.com]

Both assumptions you claim here are unjustified and irrational, as we discussed before a number of times. What's worse, since the only thing we have are interpretations, by assuming truth, "you" actually foreclose a possibility of inferring it. I quoted "you", since the position you just argued is at variance with the one at the root of this branch, so I take both of them with a grain of salt, more as a rhetorical point, rather then considered opinion.

But assuming you would give it a further consideration, this actually have much to do with analyzing the subject, more specifically a methodology of religious inquiry.

Re: fallacy

[brotherinlaw.livejournal.com]

I've been looking for self-contradiction that you claim to exist, but to no avail:-( What I find >at the root of the branch< is my assertion that your interpretation of Avot 1:1 belongs to the realm of imagination. This assertion would be found euphemistic by anyone ("religious" or "secular") who (unlike you or I) gave Mishna/Talmud a scholarly study. I can't see where I deviate from that.

What deserves consideration in the rest of your comment is that >by assuming truth,< one >actually forecloses a possibility of inferring it.< This seems to be a result of misunderstanding, perhaps deliberate. The arriving at an assumption (belief) is a process based on induction (the non-rational step) and critical verification, which is rational analysis, i. e. is based on inference. This latter step is not tantamount to "proof" (otherwise it would be knowledge and not belief) but is what makes the difference between rational and irrational belief. Somewhat simplistically, this process is described at the beginning of God, Man, and History by r. Berkovitz. And the Rambam's Guide for the Perplexed is entirely devoted to such rational verifications - which is in no contradiction with the fact that the Rambam does assume the truths that he verifies. The main function of such verification is not a "partial proof" but is formative with respect to the assumption (belief); it allows us to arrive at a better understanding of the assumption's subject and predicate and thus to improve the formulation of the assumption. (This is because an unverified assumption - an irrational belief - is not wrong but is essentially meaningless: e. g. the one whose belief is "This idol rules" does not know what is "idol" and what is "rule".)

The aforementioned first step in arriving at a belief (assumption) - the induction - is (in a sense; please see below) always correct; Aristotle calls it "the most reliable first principles." Therefore, assuming its verity is not a fallacy but a necessity. But this only means that the induction suggests something that is true. What is this something needs to be determined, to the extent it is possible, at the verification step. E. g. induction suggests to me that the rabbinical doctrine of resurrection is correct. Attempts by various people to determine what should and what should not be understood by resurrection and how it relates to the rest of tradition seem to me successful enough to accept the doctrine. Another example: the Sadducees said that there would be no resurrection. It is induction that suggested it to them, so it must be correct in a sense. In what sense? Something like: "If temple service is the essence of Jewish destiny then there is no need in resurrection and therefore there will be no resurrection." They accepted this, and since they (irrationally, as we can say now) believed in temple service, they arrived at non-resurrection. We accept the same proposition above (in quotes), and since we came to believe that temple service is not the essence of Jewish destiny, the accepted proposition does not establish anything about whether or not there is resurrection, though this proposition is true by formal logic.

Re: fallacy

[nedosionist.livejournal.com]

This surely is much better, and mostly I have no problem with your argument here (there are couple finer nuances, and I suspend judgement on the merits of the doctrine of resurrection for present discussion). To recap, this branch started with your comment а кто из них понимал лучше - это потом рассудила жизнь (=рассудил Бог), which I rejected, and you rejected my rejection ;)) etc. When I said that your position on this issue varies, it can be seen right here is this branch. You declared a very strong fallacious position (as just cited), then a softer one , with both claims based on shared assumptions, and now a much better one. Here you are properly staying within the scope of evaluating argument on its merits, and do not appeal to "life's judgement" as a truth-criteria. I have a problem with your first claim in this chain; so long as you already moved far away from it, the debate becomes moot. We can move on or revisit prior arguments, if it is warranted(?).

Re: fallacy

[brotherinlaw.livejournal.com]

I wish I knew how a (somewhat boring, wasn't it?) explanation of a thesis can be better, still more wonderfully >much better<, than the thesis itself. Since I definitely cannot claim the achievement of changing/developing my views during this conversation, I have to suspect either my excessive brevity (?) or your unwillingness to give the subject a proper consideration. Whatever the rub, now it happily seems to belong to the past, though you still seem to underrate the fact that the destruction of the Temple was a result of the same judgment by God which nullified the Sadducees' doctrine, and at the same time it was a fact of life, so the original formulation was legitimate. In fact, all facts of life result from His judgment. Only, this judgment may be (is in most cases) an unclear (for us) combination of different judgments, general and specific, such as the general ancient judgment to grant man freedom of will, and more specific judgments about current human affairs, plus of course suspension of judgment. It is because of this complexity that unqualified references to "life's judgment" are generally unacceptable, and this is the truth of your objection; and we know by now that there must've been some truth in your objection, don't we? ;) - since you presumably arrived at it by induction (=your evident reaction to "life's judgment" was indignation), and induction is infallible at least in some sense...